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CONFUCIAN ETHICS, JUDGES,
AND WOMEN: DIVORCE UNDER
THE REVISED KOREAN FAMILY LAW
Kay C. Lee
Abstract: The historic revision of the South Korean Family Law in 1989 abolished
many entrenched legal practices based on Confucian ethics that discriminate against
women. Among its many provisions, the law provides for an equitable division of mari-
tal property upon divorce and ends the tradition of the father's automatic right to child
custody, unless waived. However, in a legal system where judges wield unquestioned
authority and wide discretion, judicial decisions based on traditional assumptions about
women and family continue to frustrate the democratic intent of the revised law. Given
the vague laws that give the judiciary broad discretion, real changes are possible only
with further protective measures enacted by the legislature. In the interim, judges must
critically examine their unquestioned authority as well as personal biases in their legal
and social contexts.
I. INTRODUCTION
The South Koreanl legislature revised its family laws2 in 1989; the
revisions went into effect in January 1991. For the first time in Korean
history, these laws provide a foundation for women to actually obtain legal
rights equal to that of men at divorce, an equality guaranteed in principle in
the Korean Constitution.
The new family laws are a victory for the women's movement, which
dates back to 1973 when 61 women's organizations formed the All
Women's Federation to Revise the Family Law.3 Backed by this coalition
of women's groups, the few women in the National Assembly introduced
I This Comment is confined to the laws and social changes in the Republic of Korea (South Korea).
Those of the People's Republic of Korea (North Korea) differ in significant ways. Although the Korean
peninsula is divided into two Koreas, the designation of "Korea" or "Korean(s)" in this Comment refers
only to South Korea or South Korean(s).
2 Minbop [Civil Code], Book IV [hereinafter Family Law], in CURRENT LAWS OF THE REPUBLIC OF
KOREA, vol. II (Seoul: Korea Legislation Research Institute, 1994). Korean Civil Code is divided into five
books. Following the German Civil Law model, the first three books deal with general provisions, prop-
erty rights, and obligations in general. The fourth and fifth books are an institutionalized version of
Korean customs covering family and successions. CHIN KIM, KOREAN LAW STUDY GUIDE 10 (1987).
3 Rosa Kim, The Legacy oflnstitutionalized Gender Inequality in South Korea: The Family Law,
14 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 145 n.1 (1994), available in WESTLAW, TP-ALL Database.
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and pushed through the laws that laid the foundation for the revision.4 The
struggle of the small minority of women legislators was complicated by the
mass rallies waged by the Confucianist lobby against the revision.5 The fact
that the predominantly male legislature resisted the pressure from the tradi-
tionalists6 is a clear indication of the changes taking place in Korea.
7
Instituting a democratic form of government was one such change. After
four decades of dictatorship in one form or another, establishment of a
democratic government in 1987 suddenly made the women's vote count.8
Although the new laws grant broad discretion to the courts, the legis-
lative intent behind the revision was to guarantee equal rights for women in
the areas of marriage, divorce, child custody, and property inheritance. 9 For
example, under the revised law, the marital residence is no longer presumed
to be solely the husband's family home. Rather, it must be jointly deter-
mined by the couple upon marriage.10 Most significantly, for the first time,
4 YONHAP YONGAM [The United Yearbook] 250 (1993) [hereinafter YONGAM]. Between 1948
and 1991, on the average, women comprised no more than 2% of the legislative body. The worldwide
average of women legislators was 10% during the same period. In 1992, only three out of 299 members of
the National Assembly were women. Id.
5 See Karl Schoenberger, Korea: It's suffer, not suffragette, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 16, 1989, at A 1; Sam
Jameson, Changing Lifestyles: S. Koreans Shake Family-Tree Rules, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 17, 1992, at 4
[hereinafter Family-Tree Rules]. See also South Korea: No Navels, Please-We're Korean, Reuter
Newswire, Aug. 8, 1994, available in Westlaw, LATIMES Database [hereinafter No Navels]. The tradi-
tionalists also exert a significant pressure on law enforcement. For example, in 1994, in the hottest summer
since the turn of the century, some young women wore cropped T-shirts that leave their waists exposed.
Police arrested women wearing cropped T-shirts in response to protests by Confucian elements demanding
modesty in women. Even after a judge freed two women for wearing "Navel-Ts," the city police declared
that it will continue to arrest women wearing the navel T to teach them a lesson. Id. See also, The Battle of
the Belly-Button, THE ECONOMIST, Sept. 24, 1994, available in LEXIS, ASIAPC Library, ECON File
[hereinafter Belly-Button].
6 "Traditionalists" in this Comment refer to the Koreans adhering to Confucian ideals, such as male
ancestor worship, filial piety, among others. See infra notes 21-25 and accompanying text.
7 The legislature was not as successful against the Confucian lobby on the issue of the abolition of
the family headship system and prohibition against intra-clan marriage. See Rosa Kim, supra note 3, at 5-
6. See also infra notes 25-27 and accompanying text.
8 In this new political atmosphere, the long suppressed human rights issues, such as equal rights for
women, found supportive forums in Korea and in the international human rights organizations. The All
Women's Federation was instrumental in Korea's ratification of the United Nations Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women in 1984. The convention went into effect as
domestic law in 1985, with an important exception: Article 16(g) concerning a woman's right to choose a
family name, profession, and occupation. G.A. Res. 180, U.N. GAOR, 34th Sess., Supp. No. 46, at 193,
U.N.Doc. A/34/36 (1979), cited in Rosa Kim, supra note 3, at 6-9. As a result of the changed political
atmosphere, women gained the Equal Employment Rights Law in 1987, and finally the Revised Family
Law in 1991. YONGAM, supra note 4, at 250.
9 Bong-hui Han, Hanguk Gajokbope Hynjaewa Jonmang [The Status of the Korean Family Law
and its Future], BOPRYUL SHINMUN [THE LAW JOURNAL], Sept. 26, 1994, at 14.
10 Family Law, art. 826.
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the law entitles a woman to an equitable share of the marital property upon
divorce." Equally remarkably, a father may no longer automatically
assume his right to child custody upon divorce. 12 Lastly, abolishing the
practice of entitling the female child to only one quarter of the male child's
inheritance, the new law treats the male and female children equally for
inheritance purposes.13
The changing times have also made an impact on the Korean judici-
ary, and some courts have honored the legislative intent of equal rights for
women. Even so, individual judicial decisions still reveal great reluctance
to challenge the traditional Confucian ethics about women and the family.
These ethics provide the judges with a "consistent and well-articulated set
of principles" for defining family and the expected relationships within the
family. 14 The judges also face external obstacles that tend to make it easier
for them to identify with the traditional social norms. Powerful social insti-
tutions, such as the Confucian lobby,15 the conservative police force, 16 and
the mass media' 7 continue to recreate and reinforce the images of traditional
families.
This Comment will show that, in spite of the legislative intent behind
the recent revision, women are not yet being treated equally or equitably.
On the whole, the interpretation and application of the revised Korean law
still privilege men. Real changes will occur only if the unquestioned judi-
cial assumptions about law and social norms are challenged in their legal
and societal contexts.
In what follows, Part I provides an overview of the concept of family
in the Confucian legal tradition of Korea and a survey of the Korean legal
system, with particular emphasis on the family law. Part II analyzes the
I I Family Law, art. 839(2). Before the law was revised, a wife was entitled to only some
"compensation for suffering" if the court found the husband to be the party responsible for marital breakup.
See infra note 124.
12 Family Law, art. 837. Prior to the revisions, a woman who filed for divorce, even if the grounds
were charges of physical or mental abuse, automatically lost custody of her children unless the man waived
this right through a special custody agreement. Rosa Kim, supra note 3, at 3.
3 Family Law, art. 1009.
14 Eva R. Rubin observed the practices of the U.S. Supreme Court justices, who do not stray too far
from a basic agreement (i.e., ideology) about family. EVA R. RUBIN, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
AMERICAN FAMILY: IDEOLOGY AND ISSUES 8 (1986).
15 See No Navels, supra note 5, at 1.
16 Id.
17 Television dramas tend to portray women according to the traditional ethics that mandate the
ideals of virtuous wife and sacrificial mother. Feminists in Korea have made a small stride recently, how-
ever, when "Half Failure," a sanitized television version of short stories dealing with the problems of
contemporary, rather than traditional, women were aired. See Schoenberger, supra note 5, at 1.
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cases involving grounds for divorce, marital property division, and child
custody, to illustrate how the existing legal standards and social norms
affect women in Korea. It then suggests the kind of changes that would
encourage a deeper understanding of women's experience and the forces
that affect it, so that the intent of the family law revision has a better chance
of being put into practice. 18
II. FAMILY LAW IN THE CONFUCIAN LEGAL TRADITION
A. Family as a Confucian Social and Legal Concept
The extraordinary nature of the family law revision and the uphill
battle women face in seeing its intent actually implemented can be appreci-
ated only if the role of the family in Korea is properly understood. As in
most societies, family does not exist in isolation but is part of "an intricate,
interrelated social system" that generally encourages marriage and disap-
proves marital breakdown. 19  This societal control over family is
particularly pronounced in Korea where family constitutes "the centerpiece
of the entire society."'20
The Korean family law is a legacy of Korea's own version of
Confucianism, 2 1 founded on the tradition of male ancestor worship.22 As
such, maintenance of the paternal pedigree is a central purpose of the
18 The political and methodological underpinnings of this Comment may be characterized as one
version of feminism. The general aim is to promote equality between women and men by making the
gender the focus of the analysis. Analyzing the social and legal systems from the woman's point of view
reveals how supposed "differences associated with women are taken for granted and, unexamined, may
serve as a justification for laws that disadvantage women." Katherine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods,
103 HARV. L. REV. 829, 843 (1990). See also Deborah L. Rhode, Feminist Critical Theories, 42 STAN. L.
REV. 617 (1990); Judith G. Greenberg, Introduction to MARY JOE FRUG, POSTMODERN LEGAL FEMINISM
(1992?4 EVA RUBIN, supra note 14, at 23.
20 DAE-KYU YOON, LAW AND POLITICAL AUTHORITY IN SOUTH KOREA 8 (1990).
21 See supra note 2. What is loosely termed Confucianism really consists of numerous schools of
philosophy. Confucianism as a branch of philosophy was more successful than others, since its values
were sufficiently diverse to embrace the changing circumstances and compromise with major factions. For
a detailed discussion of Confucianism and its various schools of thought, as well as the implication in the
modem times, see Derk Bodde, The State and Empire of Ch 'in, in THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF CHINA (D.
Twitchett and M. Loewe, eds.) 20-102 (1986); BENJAMIN I. SCHWARTZ, THE WORLD OF THOUGHT IN
ANCIENT CHINA (1985).
22 YOON, supra note 20, at 8-9. See also Sam Jameson, Unchanging South Korea Celebrates Its
Ancient Roots, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 1, 1993, at A 12 [hereinafter Unchanging South Korea]; Teresa Watanabe,
South Korean Women Stride Toward Equality, L.A. TIMES, June 21, 1994, at World Section 3.
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family.23 Great importance is attached to blood relationships, represented
by the extended family covering several generations of male lines.24 Under
this system, individuals count for little, except as members of a male-
defined family, which constitutes a single unified entity in the eyes of the
law. 25
Older family law, and its revised version to some extent, is an essen-
tial element of the Confucian ethics, which are themselves premised on
male superiority. 26 Through the family register system ("Hojok"),27 the law
sanctions male authority over the rest of the family on personal, social, and
legal matters.2 8 The family register is a complex system that preserves each
clan's record through the generations. 29 The law regulates who may be
included in the family register. 30 Proof of registration, like birth certifi-
cates, is a mandatory document for acquiring identification cards, such as
passports, and official documents for education, marriage, or divorce. 3 1
The register also contains each family's ancestral history and reflects
social class.32 As a western reporter observed, most clans "keep multi-
volume registers tracing their ancestry back hundreds of years. The major
clans.., maintain offices and staffs that compile records, build monuments
to major clan ancestors and maintain their graves." 33 Moreover, the register
23 YOON, supra note 20, at 8; Unchanging South Korea, supra note 22.
24 YOON, supra note 20, at 8.
25 Hojokbob [Family Registration Law] is a law that is separate from the Civil Code. Its eight-par
provisions govern the minute details of the registration and removal of individuals from their family upon
birth, adoption, marriage, divorce, and death. The law is premised on the single "head of the household"
concept, as provided by Family Law, art. 781. Hojokbop [Family Registration Law], printed in
TAEBOBCHON [GREAT LAW DIcTIONARY] (Seoul: Bobchon Chulpansa, 1995).
26 From the family "comes all discrimination in this society... men against women, first son against
second son, father against mother. This is the original trouble-maker." This lamentation about the
Confucian family system by Dr. Lee Tai-Young, the first woman lawyer and founder of the Korea Legal
Aid Center for Family Relations, was voiced after decades of legal aid works in family relations. Quoted
in Clyde Haberman, Seoul Journal: Defining Kith and Kin in the Land of Kim and Lee, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
23, 1987, at 4.
27 Hojok is'an institutionalized system that strictly accounts for each family's patrilineal history. See
supra note 25.
28 Id. See also Family Law, art. 781.
29 In the past, strong family relations based on kinship contributed to building powerful clans
("Yanban"), which enjoyed vast land holdings and political power. YOON, supra note 20, at 9.3 Family Law, art. 781.
31 Rosa Kim, supra note 3, at 3.
32 One's social status is perpetually determined by the position of the ancestor's, and any and all
positions in government held by the ancestors are recorded in the registry. See Family-Tree Rules, supra
note 5.
33 Unchanging South Korea, supra note 22.
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provides the basis for determining the legitimacy of marriages between
parties with a common surname or origin of ancestry. 34
For women, the family register is a social institution that determines
their social and legal identity. The family law still requires women to aban-
don their own family register upon marriage and enter into the husband's
family register. 35 Coupled with the Confucian male headship system which
recognizes only the male head of the family as its legal representative, the
registration law makes it nearly impossible for women to assert legal rights
within the family and in their relations with the outside world.36 This
patrilineal system significantly limits women's right to property, since most
property and business dealings are delegated to men, who tend to acquire
the titles to property, which are exempt from division upon divorce.37
The tenacity of the Confucian legacy is most starkly exposed on
Chusok, the 2,000-year-old autumn-moon festival. Tens of millions of
Koreans join in the mass migration to return to their ancestral homes to
celebrate the harvest and worship their male ancestors. 38 Mothers, wives,
aunts, sisters, and daughters cook and clean for days to prepare for the
ceremony. On the day of Chusok, the male head of the extended family
pours wine "into separate cups for each male member of the four past
generations and leads the fathers and sons of the current extended family in
deep bows." 39 The women and girls wait in the kitchen or outside.
Thus, in Korea, the concept of family is closely linked to both formal
laws and Confucian ethics centered on the worship of the male ancestors.
To understand this relationship between law and societal ethics that control
family, it is necessary to examine the elements of the legal system and how
they operate.
34 Family Law, art. 809, prohibits marriage between people sharing the same surname and origin.
35 Family Law, art. 826 (3).
36 See Family Law, arts. 778-796, which define and limit the head of family and family members.
37 See infra note 124 and accompanying text.
38 In 1993, "an estimated 26 million of the nation's 43 million people staged a mass migration to
their native towns to carry out the rites. Most of the others gathered with relatives in their own homes."
Unchanging South Korea, supra note 22, at A12.
39 Id.
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B. The Korean Legal System
1. The Confucian and Democratic Foundations of the Law
For the Koreans with their four-thousand year history,40 rich with
indigent and borrowed customs and ethics, the concept of formal law as a
social tool is a relatively new idea.4 1 Koreans followed customary law42
handed down by the ancestors as examples of behavior 43 until the Yi
Dynasty (1392-1910 A.D.) imported a body of formal law from Ming
China.44 The Ming Dynasty Code of China closely followed the basic ten-
ets of Confucianism. 45  In this socio-legal order, the status of every
individual was clearly defined in a strict hierarchical order of domination-
subordination; for example, the ruler over the ruled, father over son, and
husband over wife.46
Korea was liberated from Japanese colonial rule in 1945. Shedding
the draconian colonial laws,47 Korea adopted a constitution that followed
the basic tenets of rights enumerated in western countries such as the United
States, Great Britain, and Germany.48 In line with the rights guaranteed in
40 The traditional Korean calendar ("Danghi") is calculated by adding 2,333 years to the western
calendar. For example, Year 1995 in the western calendar would be Year 4,328 according to the traditional
Korean calendar. Myths account for much of the beliefs about the origin of the country. However, signifi-
cant archaeological evidences uncovered in shell mounds and other remains confirm the essential points of
the myths. See YONHAP NEWS AGENCY, KOREA ANNUAL 258 (1984).
41 Throughout the Three Kingdoms (37 B.C.-917 A.D.), the Koryo Dynasty (918-1391 A.D.), and
the Chosun Dynasty (1392-1910), formal law ["yul-hak"] existed only to the extent necessary for a small
number of low-ranking officials to aid the governors administering physical punishment. Chong-ko Choi,
On the Reception of Western Law in Korea, 9 KOREAN J. CoMP. LAW 141, 142-43 (1981).
42 Customary law in the Korean context generally refers to community standards for maintaining
peace and order. This resulted in a conservative ideology based on the primacy of authority and "the
sanctification of the past." PYONG-CHOON HAHM, KOREAN JURISPRUDENCE, POLITICS AND CULTURE 17
(1986). Customary law tended to modify behavior through community interaction. By appealing to the
community standards, intervening authorities (usually the landlords or government officials) attempted to
"shame" the violators of peace and order in the community. Id at 24.
43 Chong-ko Choi, supra note 41, at 142.
44 CHIN KIM, supra note 2, at 4.
45 SUPREME COURT OF KOREA, JUDICIAL SYSTEM OF KOREA 3 (1991) [hereinafter JUDICIAL SYSTEM
OF KOREA].
46 YOON, supra note 20, at 6.
47 Id at 25-26. The Japanese colonial administration had instituted a western form of government
based on the German Civil Code system, largely for efficient and forceful administration of the colony.
Although retaining much of the earlier legal system, Koreans focused on governmental accountability to
the governed. Id at 22-26.
, 48 Linda Sue Lewis, Mediation and Judicial Process in a Korean District Court 34-35 (1984)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University) [hereinafter Lewis Dissertation]; Suk Tae Lee,
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these countries, the Korean Constitution guarantees equality of the citizens
and prohibits discrimination based on sex, religion, or social status. 49
Moreover, the constitution provides special protection to women by requir-
ing the government to affirmatively promote the welfare and rights of
women.
50
Thus, the modem constitution of Korea based on the western tradition
already contains the legal foundation for rights of women. However, demo-
cratic concepts embodied in the constitution are relatively new ideas,
subject to the individual interpretation of the judges. Hence, this new sys-
tem of law cannot be understood apart from the judges and the courts which
interpret and apply the law within a society permeated by Confucian ethics.
2. The Judiciary
The court system functions on three levels: the supreme court, high
courts, and district courts, including the family court in Seoul. 5 1 Because
the interpretation and enforcement of the revised family law starts at the
family court level, its historical foundation and special role in the legal
system are briefly examined below.
a. The history of the Family Court and its role in the legal system
In 1962, the All Women's Federation petitioned for an amendment of
the inheritance laws and the establishment of a family court. 52 The women
representing the various organizations argued that "family matters should be
heard in secret hearings in which the parties may reconcile or reach an ami-
South Korea: Implementation and Application of Human Rights Covenants, 14 MICH. J. INT'L L. 705, n.79
(199319 Honbop [Constitution], art. 11(1) [hereinafter Honbop], in I CURRENT LAWS OF THE REPUBLIC OF
KOREA (Seoul: Korea Legislation Research Institute, 1994).
50 Honbop, art. 34(3).
51 As the court of last resort, the supreme court hears appeals against the decisions of high courts,
and the appellate divisions of the district courts and the family court. Each of the four high courts in Korea
consists of a presiding judge and, usually, three associate judges. These high courts hear appeals against
verdicts and judgments of district courts and the family court in civil and criminal cases, administrative
cases, and special cases designated by law. District courts which have primary jurisdiction over most cases
are set up in Seoul and II provincial cities. JUDICIAL SYSTEM OF KOREA, supra note 45, at 6-19.
52 Although the South Korean supreme court had contemplated the founding of family courts earlier,
primarily as a result of the establishment of such courts in Japan in 1949, the more serious plans were not
discussed until after 1961. Woo-dong Park, Gajong Bopwon 20 Nyone Hwegowa Jonmang [20 Years of
Family Law Court in Retrospect and Prospect], GAJONG BOPWON SAHGONE MUNJEJOM [FAMILY COURT
ISSUES] 6-34 (1983).
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cable settlement by appealing to the moral principles, compassion, and
experience of the learned professionals in the educational, psychological,
sociological, and medical fields." 53
Following the All Women Federation's suggestion, in 1963, the
Family Court Procedure Act provided for the family court to hear all cases
involving matrimonial, juvenile, and other domestic matters.54  The
proclaimed purpose was to promote harmony and cooperation in the family
based on human dignity and equality between man and woman, as
mandated by the Constitution.55 Because of the judges' role in interpreting
and enforcing the law, their perceptions of "human dignity" and "equality"
become a paramount issue in the legal system.
b. The judges' role in the Korean civil law tradition
Judges exert extraordinary influence in Korea. 56 As discussed below,
the weak stare decisis tradition of the civil law system, the absence of trial
by jury and minimal use of trial attorneys, as well as the historical reverence
for "the magistrate," among others, account for this influence.
In the civil law tradition of Korea, higher court decisions do not
generally enjoy binding precedential power.57 However, they "exert a
significant de facto influence upon subsequent court decisions."58  This
means that trial court judges may, except for those cases remanded, choose
to interpret statutes on their own or follow the opinions of higher courts.59
In the family court and lower civil courts, judicial power is especially pro-
nounced, since parties are seldom represented by a lawyer.60 In these
53 Tae-young Lee, HANGUK EHON YONGU [EXAMINATION OF DIVORCE IN KOREA] 307 (1969),
quoted in Park, supra note 52, at 9. Regardless of whether these women were motivated by the desire to
shield other women from the traditional stigma accompanying divorce, or distrust of the judicial system,
their lea resulted in a law that mandates a conciliation hearing for all judicial divorce cases. Id
4 Park, supra note 52, at 10. Currently, Seoul is the only city with a special family court of its own;
in other cities, the district courts handle such matters. Id See also JUDICIAL SYSTEM OF KOREA, supra note
45, at 11-12. The Family Court Procedure Act was also wholly amended in 1990 to serve as the primary
source of law regulating domestic procedures. Id.
55 Honbop, art. 36(1).
56 As of December 1, 1991, there were 14 supreme court justices, 236 high court judges, and 799
district court judges, including family court judges, for a total of 1049. The total number of public prose-
cutors was 807 as of August 1, 1991; the total number of practicing lawyers was 2,135 as of March 12,
1991. See CHIN KIM, supra note 2, at 14, 18-19.
57 Id at 8.
58 Id. at 20; see also CHIN KIM, supro note 2, at 8.
59 CHIN KIM, supra note 2, at 8.
60 Lewis Dissertation, supra note 48, at 72.
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proceedings, the judge actively questions witnesses, admonishes defen-
dants, and offers advice on points of law.6 1
In general, determining how judges exercise their discretionary power
involves complex questions dealing with social and psychological
dimensions. However, the educational and training background of the
judges may provide some insight into their professional norms.
1) The uniform education and training of thejudges
All aspirants to a legal career in Korea undergo the same process of
passing the state judicial examination for entry into a two-year study at the
Judicial Research and Training Institute ("JRTI").62 Each year, the
government predetermines a set number of applicants to be admitted to
JRTI.63
The state judicial examination for entry into JRTI consists of three
phases. First, tens of thousands of candidates take the initial multiple
choice test on law, history, economics, and a foreign language.64 Only
about 1,500 go on to the second hurdle-an essay test on law and "national
ethics." 65 Those who pass the essay test face a personal interview designed
to "screen out individuals deemed to be security risks or otherwise politi-
cally unreliable." 66
The select group of people surviving the interview is admitted to a
two-year government-sponsored course at the JRTI. Upon completion, a
few choose to go into private practice, while most opt for public service as
either a prosecutor or judge. 67 Thus, judgeship in Korea, at least at the trial
level, is the fruit of the same compulsory training that all lawyers receive.
61 Id. at 72.
62 Kyong-hwan Ahn, How Do We Produce Judicial Officials? KOREA Focus ON CURRENT EVENTS,
1993, at 31-32 (1993).
63 JAMES M. WEST, EDUCATION OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION IN KOREA, 19 (1991). In recent years,
the number has been around 300. Id at 20.
64 Id. at 19.
65 Id. It has been observed that "compulsory courses in national ethics relate back to traditional
Confucian notions of political morality as well as to Prussian and Japanese theories viewing propagation of
loyalty to the state as the primary function of 'modem' public education." Dae-Kwon Choi, Legal
Education in Korea: Problems and Reform Efforts, 29(2) SEOUL L.J. 114 (1988), cited in WEST, supra
note 63, at 19 n.51.
66 WEST, supra note 63, at 19. Until 1980, the total number of the successful examinees was less
than 150; until 1977 less than 100. The total number of people failing the final interview numbered three
(out of 1235) between 1963 and 1979; the number skyrocketed from 1980 until 1988 to 177 out of 2390,
slighty over 7 percent Id. at 86.6 7 Lewis Dissertation, supra note 48, at 73.
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Having gone through the same legal training in a single national cen-
ter, Korean judges, for the most part, are a homogeneous group. 68 An
ethnography of the judges in a large rural city reveals that they tend to use a
"conventional, bureaucratic approach . . . in a relatively closed world in
which hierarchies [are] fixed and most issues [are] resolved on an authori-
tarian basis without much external pressure for extensive rationalization of
decisions handed down. 69
Education is not the only common social force shaping the judicial
decisions in Korea. As shown below, the judges also share the image of the
"Confucian magistrate."
2) Judges as the parents of the people
The modern ideal of the Korean judiciary, which is overwhelmingly
male (98%),70 follows the traditional ideal of the magistrate as the "parent
of the people," 7 1 entrusted with guiding and protecting the litigants.
Befitting the paternalistic conception of the magistrate is the notion of
benevolence or leniency toward the litigants. Thus, when a respected judge
was appointed chief of a district court, a local magazine praised him for
"inspir[ing] many litigants with his kind advice." 72
As a parental figure, a judge may be kind, compassionate, or impa-
tient. The magistrate "actively directs every inquiry, coaxing shy witnesses,
scolding others who stray from the point, and admonishing some to tell the
truth."73 It has also been observed that "civil court judges are particularly
scornful of those whom they feel have violated accepted standards of behav-
ior or have acted in socially inappropriate ways."74 Thus, litigants are well
68 Most lower court judges start a few years after graduation from an undergraduate study in law,
and then enter a private law practice after some years ofjudgeship. Id. at 76.
69 WEST, supra note 63, at 35.
70 Linda Sue Lewis, Her Honor the Judge: Women and the Legal Professions in Korea (Harvard
Korea Colloquium Paper, Apr. 10, 1990), noted in WEST, supra note 63, at 82. For 38 years (1951-1989),
only 74 women passed the judicial examination. There has been a slight increase in the number of women
passing the examination since 1989 when 14 women succeeded. In 1990, 12 women were admitted, and in
1991, 18 more women were admitted. Id.
71 Lewis Dissertation, supra note 48, at 191.
72 Chon II Kurap'u [Chon II Graph], New Court Heads Appointed, (June 1980), reprinted in Lewis
Dissertation, supra note 48, at 71.
73 Lewis Dissertation, supra note 48, at 177. The description is based on an ethnographer's personal
observation of civil proceedings in district courts. Family court proceedings are not open to public for
observation.
74 Id at 196.
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advised to approach the judges as humble supplicants with petitions for a
wise and fair judgment.75
The judges' role as the "parents of the people" has a great impact on
judicial divorce, which is granted only if a judge finds a legally acceptable
ground for divorce. A brief overview of the law on divorce is thus vital in
appreciating the Confucian social dynamics of the interplay between pater-
nalistic judges and parties to judicial divorce.
3. Divorce Law in Korea
Divorce in Korea was a relatively rare phenomenon until 1980. Since
then, the overall divorce rate has seen a steady increase, from 5.5 percent in
1980 to 12 percent in 1991.76 By 1994, one out of every seven marriages
ended in divorce.77 Along with the rising rate of divorce, the number of
women filing for divorce also increased. 78
Korean family law provides two ways of dissolving a marriage:
divorce by agreement and judicial divorce. 79 Divorce by agreement
requires minimum judicial involvement. This can be contrasted to
contested cases, where couples are required to submit their differences to a
conciliation council in the family court.80 The council's role is to help
couples reconcile the differences or, failing that, reach an agreement for
divorce.8 ' Cases not solved at the conciliation hearing are sent to trial for
judicial divorce.82
75 Id. at 80.
76 Choon-eui Hong, Youchak Bawooja Ehon Chung-goowa Patanjooe Ehon [Petition for Divorce by
the Party at Fault and No Fault Divorce] HYUNDAI MINBOPE KWAJEWA JONMANG [THE CURRENT TASK
AND FUTURE PROSPECTS FOR MODERN CIVIL LAW] 199 (1994) [hereinafter HYUNDAI].
77 Belly-Button, supra note 5.
78 Women petitioned for divorce in 48 percent of the cases in 1979. By 1990, women petitioned for
divorce in 57 percent of the cases. Hong, supra note 76, at 199.
79 Family Law, arts. 834-843. In 1990, the number of judicial divorce cases reached the highest
number. Out of 90,411 cases filed, 20,142 (22.28%) were resolved in court. Yong-ok Kim, Hyubeui
Ehone Whagin [Confirmation of Divorce by Agreement), in HYUNDAI, supra note 76, at 191.
80 Gajokbop [Family Law], art. 11(2). Gajokbop is a set of provisions governing, among other
matters, divorce procedures. It is not part of the Civil Code, Book IV, entitled "Relatives," which has been
referred to as "Family Law" in this Comment.
81 Although designed to soften the judicial fiat (see supra note 52 and accompanying text), the
conciliation council composed of learned members of society tends to uphold the social norms. The
common belief in traditionally Confucian societies is that conflicts should be "settled by mediation within
the lineage, family, guild, local community, or other relevant groups." Lewis Dissertation, supra note 48,
at 24. The parties are frequently cajoled, persuaded, or even rebuked to avoid the conflicts. Id. at 243.
As shown in the official picture in JUDICIAL SYSTEM OF KOREA, supra note 45, at Ii, the physical
setting of the conciliation proceeding also belies the ideology of harmony that is perpetuated at the expense
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a. Divorce by agreement
Divorce by agreement is essentially a removal of the wife's name
from the husband's family register,83 after the couple reaches an agreement
on property and children.84 The couple then submits to a judge a copy of
the husband's family register, application for divorce, and a request for
judicial confirmation. The judge verifies the identity of the couple, and asks
the parties whether the agreement was made voluntarily. 85 If satisfied with
the voluntary nature of the agreement, the judge stamps both the confirma-
tion form and the "Report of Divorce." 86
The final step involves the removal of the wife's name from the hus-
band's family register within three months.87 After the removal, the woman
of the weaker party to the conflict. Seated at one end of a semicircle table is the judge, flanked by two
conciliators on each side. The parties sit side by side, facing the judge, near the other end of the table.
Because the couple is seated some distance from the table, there is a conspicuous space between the parties
and the judge and conciliators. The lone woman conciliator is in a demure traditional costume, while the
others are in western suit and tie. Even when a couple is making a mandatory appearance for the judicial
confirmation of the parties' voluntary intent to divorce, they are seated side by side facing the judges. Id
at 27. In contrast, parties in non-domestic matters are seated opposite from each other. Id. at 21.
Consistent with the focus on the emotional aspects of marital disputes, family matters are rele-
gated for the most part to less rigorous legal proceedings. But conciliation can be turned into a tool to
"block the use of litigation by the other party, whose legal basis may be much stronger." Setsuo
Miyazawa, Taking Kawashima Seriously: A Review of Japanese Research on Japanese Legal
Consciousness and Disputing Behavior, 21 LAW & Soc. R. 219, at 234-35 (1987). Conciliation may also
be "used to press weaker parties into accepting less than they could have expected had their case gone
through traditional adversarial channels." David Greatbatch & Robert Dingwall. Selective Facilitation:
Some Preliminary Observation in a Strategy Used by Divorce Mediators, 23 LAW & SOC. R. 613 (1989).
This risk is even more of a problem for women in a traditionally male-dominated society, where the
husband holds the economic and other means of control for the most part. See also Rhode, supra note 18.
82 There is one conciliation council within each of the district courts, and also in the family court in
Seoul. Each council is composed of at least three members: a judge, who acts as chairman, and two or
more nonjudicial people of "learning and high moral standing," such as psychiatrists, social workers, or
psychotherapists. Tae-yong Lee, WHAT CAN I Do? (1981), Soun-Sook Chyung, trans. Seoul: Korean
Legal Aid Center for Family Relations, quoted in Lewis, supra note 48, at 140. The council's decision
carries the same force as a judicial decree. Id at 135.
83 Sang-suk Lee, Saerang-gwa Gyolhone Bopryul [Law on Love and Marriage] 287, Seoul: Bopryul
Shinmunsa (1987).
84 The couple may circle any one of the five pre-printed reasons on the petition form. The loosely
defined categories-(l) marital conflicts, (2) familial conflicts, (3) health, (4) money, (5) others-appear to
provide some space for privacy and flexibility. Report of Divorce, reprinted in SANG-SUK LEE, supra note
83, at 288-89.
85 The law specifies "joint signatures." Family Law, art. 836.
86 SANG-SUK LEE, supra note 83, at 289.
87 Despite the perfunctory nature of the confirmation process, once divorce by agreement is
pronounced, courts are reluctant to reconsider the fairness of the original agreement. The court in one case
refused to revoke the agreement for a woman who claimed her former husband had defrauded her for the
sole purpose of obtaining the agreement. Judgment of July 28, 1981, Daebopwon [Supreme Court], 80 me
77.
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re-enters her name into her paternal family register.88 Children remain in
the father's family register, regardless of legal and physical custody.89
b. Judicial divorce
The Korean judicial divorce law is premised on the fault-based
system of a contest between a "wrong-doer" and the "wronged." 90 The
courts reason that a "guiltless" spouse should not be forced into unwanted
divorce.9 1
Korean legal scholars supporting the fault-based system generally cite
the following reasons: Granting divorce to the party at fault goes against
the Confucian morality ("doei"), and it may encourage the husband to arbi-
trarily abandon his wife, as was the practice in the past.92 Moreover, by
forcing a couple to stay in marriage, it is believed that a wife will be able to
continue to use the common property and receive support. 93
The fault-based system in Korea acknowledges six grounds for
divorce:94 (1) Infidelity; (2) malicious desertion; (3) extreme cruelty by the
spouse or the spouse's lineal ascendants; 95 (4) spouse's extreme cruelty to
88 Family Law, art. 787(l).
89 Id
90 The Korean Supreme Court has repeatedly held that Korean divorce law is premised on the fault-
based system. See Judgments of June 8, 1971, 71 me 18; July 12, 1983, 83 me 11; April 23, 1993, 92 me
1078.
91 Bong-hui Han, supra note 9, at 14.
92 See Tae-yong Lee, supra note 52, at 302-303; Kwang-hyun Chong, HANGUK GmOKBoP YONGU
(RESEARCH ON KOREAN FAMILY LAW) 801 (1967); Choon-eui Hong, supra note 76, at 202.
93 Choon-eui Hong, supra note 76, at 202.
94 Family Law, art. 840.
95 Lineal ascendants include parents and grandparents. A woman must show extraordinary suffering
for the court to grant divorce under the "extreme cruelty" ground. The traditional notion that women
"belong" to men persists, and to date no case has recognized wife beating as the sole grounds for divorce
under extreme cruelty. Yet, according to the survey of 340 women conducted by the Korea Women's
Hotline, one in ten Korean women are beaten by their husbands almost every day, and about three in ten
women suffer violence at the hands of their spouses once a month on the average. South Korea: Wife
Battering in S. Korea is Endemic, Says Poll, Reuter Newswire-Far East, Apr. 3, 1994, available in
WESTLAW, INT-NEWS Database.
It appears that extreme cruelty, in the court's eyes, requires more than the kind of sustained and
systematic abuse of human dignity that wife beating represents. For example, the court granted divorce to
a woman abused by her husband and his family in an extended family home. In this case, the scornful
family ostracized the wife by systematically shunning her, slandering and cursing, interrogating her about
her personal phone calls, movements in and out of the house, and family finances, and interfering with her
intimate relations with the husband. The husband joined his family in abusing the wife. When the wife's
pregnancy resulted in a miscarriage, the husband charged her with the criminal act of illegal abortion.
Judgment of April 17, 1978, Daebopwon (Supreme Court], 77 re 140.
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one's own lineal ascendants; (5) missing for three years; (6) any other
cogent reasons.96
Women consulting the Seoul Legal Aid Center during 1991 through
1993 most frequently cited "extreme cruelty," "other cogent reasons," or
"malicious desertion" as the ground for divorce.97 However, judges seldom
grant judicial divorce on grounds other than infidelity.9 8 For parties denied
judicial divorce, only two recourses are available: divorce by agreement or
no divorce at all.
Part III describes how the entrenched Confucian social system and
existing legal standards affect Korean women in a proceeding for judicial
divorce.
HI. EFFECTS OF LEGAL AND SOCIAL PRACTICES ON WOMEN UPON
DIVORCE
Adjudication of family matters in Korea is fraught with subjective,
contextual, and personalized tests with an extraordinary amount of discre-
tion reserved for judges.99 To the extent that the laws dealing with divorce
and child custody provide judges with extremely general and flexible stan-
dards, judges bear the ultimate responsibility for deciding the outcome.
On occasion, the courts have been willing to break away from the
male-centered Confucian traditions that discriminate against women.
96 Adhering to the traditional norms that discourage marital conflict, courts are extremely reluctant
to grant divorce under this provision. When the court makes an exception, it generally refuses to apply the
fault standard. For example, in a case where a wife sued for divorce because the husband interrogated the
wife about her premarital sexual conduct, the court granted divorce to the wife but denied compensation,
holding that she did not establish any fault on the part of the husband. Judgment of Nov. 29, 1964,
Daebopwon [Supreme Court), 64 de 320.
9 1 Suk-cha Kim, Ehon Wonin (Grounds for Divorce), HYUNDAI, supra note 75, at 180, 184. The
"other cogent reasons" also constituted the most frequently cited ground for men during 1991 through
1993. Excluding the "miscellaneous" category under "other cogent reasons," men cited wife's illness or
disease and personality conflict most frequently. Women's main grounds continued to be extreme
maltreatment from husband or his ascendants (31.9%) and "other cogent reasons" (38.7%). Unlike women,
however, abuse by the spouse or her ascendants was cited in only 4.6% of the cases. Malicious desertion
was the next most frequently cited reason for men. Id, at 184.
98 Id at 178-79. In 1991, the grounds for divorce for 21,699 cases, excluding cases withdrawn
before the mediation, involved infidelity (43.9%) and malicious desertion (17.4%). Most desertions occur
as a result of "unchaste" spouses leaving the spouse. Thus, 61.3% of the cases involve infidelity in one
form or another. Extreme cruelty by the spouse or spouse's ascendants amounts to 16.8%. Likewise, in
1992, of the 21,699 official cases, infidelity was the most frequently cited reason (46.7%), followed by
malicious desertion (18. 1)%, and spousal abuse (17.6%). Id.
99 This applies to the legal processes in the United States as well. See Jane W. Ellis, The Changing
Face of Divorce Custody Law in Washington State 329-330 (1994), HYUNDAI, supra note 76, which notes
"virtually unfettered discretion" of trial judges in child custody cases.
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However, most judges are not yet ready to abandon all of the cultural values
that keep women in the lower economic status in this traditional society. To
illustrate just how these cultural values and stereotypes affect the judicial
decisions, presented below are cases dealing with the concept of fault in
judicial divorce, division of marital property, and the awarding of child
custody.
A. The Ambivalent Judicial Attitude Toward the Fault-Based System in
Korea
In a fault-based system, whether to allow a divorce at all is a para-
mount issue. Marriage is deemed to be a stabilizing social, economic, and
moral force for good, and is not to be easily dissolved.100 Thus, extremely
solid grounds are needed to break up the family. Another policy behind the
high threshold requirement for "fault" divorce has been to protect the eco-
nomically weaker woman from losing the economic and social advantage of
marriage when abandoned by her husband.101
However, in a traditional society, the economically stronger husband
would be in a position to threaten or bribe the woman into divorce by
agreement, while the converse is not likely to be true. Lacking the means to
bargain for divorce by agreement, more women than men turn to the
court.102 Although more women than men turn to the judiciary for help, it is
doubtful whether they actually benefit under the fault-based divorce system
as it is carried out in Korea.
To be sure, the court's double standard is not nearly as pronounced as
it used to be. In the past, Confucian ethics regarding the virtues of a wife
and the unquestioned rights of a husband dictated whether a party was enti-
tled to judicial divorce. For example, the Supreme Court held and
confirmed later that a wife, who left her husband because he could not
provide for the family, had committed a malicious desertion. 10 3 On the
other hand, if a husband deserted his family because he was not accorded
due respect as the patriarch of the family, and if his only fault was not
100 RUBIN, supra note 14, at 3.
101 Hong, supra note 76.
102 In 1993, of the 4,473 who visited the Legal Aid Center, 3,841 were women. Suk-cha Kim,
supra note 97, at 184. In Japan, women file three-quarters of petitions for divorce mediation. Taimie L.
Bryant, Marital Dissolution in Japan, 17 LAW IN JAPAN 73, 77 (1984).
103 Judgment of Jan. 6, 1948, Daebopwon [Supreme Court], 4280 minsang 144; Judgment of Dec.
9, 1969, Daebopwon [Supreme Court], 68 me 31.
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supporting the family during his desertion, his desertion was ruled not
malicious.' 04 Instead, the court ruled that fault lay with the wife who did
not show proper respect for the husband in the first place. 105
Unlike in the past, the discriminatory practices of the judiciary are not
carried out in a simple formulaic way. The system struggles through the
different fact patterns it faces, and this seeming struggle, as illustrated
below, gives the perception of fairness.
The articulated legal philosophy that a wrong-doer is not entitled to
petition for divorce is not a clear-cut rule. The rigidity of the fault standard
wavers when judges confront the proper role of women, as dictated by
Confucian morality. For example, in 1987, a woman filed a criminal charge
against her husband who had deserted her and their children to live with his
mistress. 106 The wife had been subjected to physical beatings and public
humiliation each time she appealed to him for reconciliation. 107 The court
granted divorce to the husband, who sued for divorce after serving his
sentence for adultery in a separate criminal action. 108 In this case, the court
reasoned that, where the "innocent" party has clearly shown a willingness to
divorce [inferred from filing a criminal charge], even the guilty party may
be granted divorce.109
Significantly, the court's opinion, which is ordinarily nothing but a
terse statement of the facts and rules, repeatedly emphasized the fact that the
wife refused to withdraw the criminal charge against the husband and, as a
result, the husband's medical license was revoked.1 0 The court appears to
have been motivated by its irritation at the recalcitrant wife who "caused"
the loss of the husband's medical license. Thus, the supposedly clear legal
concepts of wrong-doers and the wronged in the fault system become
blurred by the deeply-held sense of social morality held by the judges.
The same court-which had struggled to balance the merits of an
abusive and adulterous man's acts against the wife's audacity in bringing a
criminal charge against the husband-returned to the traditional rhetoric of
adultery as the evil and proper cause for divorce in another case where it
104 Judgment of June 24, 1986, Daebopwon [Supreme Court], 85 me 6.
105 Id.
106 Judgment of Apr. 14, 1987, Daebopwon [Supreme Court], 86 me 28.
107 Id.
108 Ordinarily, divorce is granted to the party complaining of adultery upon conviction and
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was a wife who was charged with the crime. In this case, decided in 1994,
the wife left the husband as a result of conflicts with her parents-in-law,
who lived with the couple.I1 While separated, she was involved in three
different extra-marital affairs with the guests of the tea house she operated
to support herself.'1 2 The husband charged her with adultery and the wife
served seven months in prison."13  The wife paid the compensation
demanded by the husband in return for his voluntary seal for divorce.
114
After receiving the compensation, the husband reneged on his promise. 15
Although the court granted divorce to the wife, as there had been "an objec-
tively verifiable intent" on the part of the husband to divorce, it reaffirmed
the societal condemnation of adultery.116
At no point did the court consider the wife's conflict with the parents-
in-law, the cause of the marital separation in the first place. What appears
to have been taken for granted is the unquestioned assumption that a wife's
duty is to practice the virtues of self-sacrifice and tolerance in her dealings
with the lineal ascendants of the husband (i.e., parents-in-law).
Judges may feel an obligation to discourage the breakdown of a
traditional social institution, such as the extended family system. However,
most extended families involve a living arrangement with the husband's
family, and serious conflicts between the wife and the husband's family are
a chronic social problem."l 7 Indeed, one of the grounds for divorce
involves "cruelty" to (or by) in-laws. 81 8 Given these social and historical
contexts, judges must question whether the woman should shoulder the
responsibilities of fostering harmony in an extended family.
B. Property Division
Within months after the effective date of the revised law, women
petitioned in divorce actions for equitable division of property, 1 9 and these
1I Judgment of Apr. 12, 1994, Seoul Gajong Bopwon [Family Court], 93 de 22429, as reported in






117 Ho Chong, Ehon Wonine Kwanhayo [In re Grounds for Divorce] at 320, in FAMILY COURT
ISSUES, supra note 52.
118 Family Law, art. 840 (3-4).
119 The first decision regarding property division under the new law was handed down by the Seoul
Family Court on May 15, 1991, 90 de 62624.
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early cases reached the Supreme Court by 1993.120 While tradition-
breaking decisions were being hailed in these heady times, two fundamental
problems continue to hamper women's rights to an equitable division of
property.
First, the new law deals with a limited proportion of a couple's prop-
erty. Divisible marital property is defined as that which was "realized by
cooperation of both parties and other circumstances" [emphasis added], 12 1
or any property of uncertain ownership. 122 The so-called "special property"
which was acquired prior to marriage and that acquired during the marriage
in the husband's or wife's name is not divisible as marital property.123 The
1991 revision did not amend this paragraph, which continues to be a source
of inequity in Korea, where men still represent the household in most busi-
ness and property transactions. 124 As long as the system of male headship
continues, women are entitled to only a limited portion of the marital
property.
Aside from the constraints imposed by the male headship system,
women face an uphill battle against the unchanged judicial assumptions
about women's worth. Most Korean legal scholars interpret the new law to
mean dividing property according to the contribution each made to the
marital property and fairness concerns over the parties' post-divorce eco-
nomic condition. 12 5 Similarly, the Seoul Family Court held in 1991 that
division of property is premised on the amount of contribution made by
each party and consideration and protection of the party with less economic
means. 126 However, the marital property division cases decided under the
revised law to date starkly illustrate the problem of laws that depend on
broad judicial discretion. In a society where women are still regarded as the
120 Bong-hui Han, supra note 9, at 14.
121 Family Law, art. 839-2 (2).
122 Family Law, art. 830 (2).
123 Family Law, art. 830 (1).
124 In the past, a wife was allowed only 'compensation" for unjust divorce, and only if she was
deemed to be the "innocent" party. By custom and by law, which recognizes only the patrilineal family
registration, all marital property was deemed to belong to the husband. Rosa Kim, supra note 3, at 4-5.
125 See Yong-jin Ohm, Ehonshie Jaesan Bunhal Chongukwon [Petition for Property Division upon
Divorcel, HYUNDA, supra note 76, at 220.
126 It also declared that Family Law art. 843, which provides for compensation to the "innocent"
party for suffering resulting from unwanted divorce, is an issue separate from the issue of property divi-
sion. Thus, a woman may petition for both her rightful share of property as well as compensation for
divorce. Judgment of May 16, 1991, Seoul Gajong Bopwon [Family Court], 90 de 62624. See also
Judgment of June 7, 1991, Seoul Family Court, 89 de 58308; Judgment of June 13, 1991, Seoul Family
Court, 91 de 1220.
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primary caretaker at home or relegated to secondary jobs, even an equal
division means a gross disparity in the living standards after divorce.
Because women's work has been traditionally devalued in Korea,
127
as in Japan and in most other countries, dividing property according to
wife's "contribution" toward the accumulation of the marital property often
translates into a token award. 128 Thus far, a Korean woman being awarded
50 percent of the marital property has been rare enough to merit an entry in
Yonhap Yongam, an annual publication devoted to noting the most signifi-
cant events of the year. 129 In one case, the Seoul Family Court ordered a
physician to pay one-half of the value of the marital property 30 to his
wife. 131 At the time of the couple's wedding, the husband was still in medi-
cal training. Thus, the court reasoned that the entire property to be divided
had been accumulated during the marriage. 132 In another case, the court
also awarded one-half of the marital property to a wife who not only did all
of the housework but also was the main provider for the family, by peddling
household items door-to-door, while even managing to put funds aside as
family savings. 133 The fact that these 50-percent awards were noted as
unprecedented judicial magnanimity 34 is a poignant reminder of the status
of women in a paternalistic legal system.
Also hailed was the decision that a wife who was at fault is entitled to
some marital property.135 While in prison for adultery, a woman petitioned
for marital property. The court ordered the wife to pay the husband 20 mil-
lion won (about $25,000) to compensate him for his suffering. The court
then recognized the wife's homemaking contribution to the marital property
127 Even though an equal opportunities law was passed in 1987, the maximum penalty inflicted on
firms that openly recruit only men for any position requiring more than "tea-serving" has been only I
million won (approximately $1,200)." Belly-Button, supra note 5. According to the International Labor
Organization, Korean women work longer hours than women in other countries; yet, they earn only 54% as
much as men. Id.
128 In Japan, broad judicial discretion results, in fact, in low monetary award for women upon
divorce. Two reasons have been cited. First, judges have a very poor understanding of the dismal eco-
nomic circumstances of women, and second, "lower awards are expected to deter divorce actions." Bryant,
supra note 102, at 82.
129 YONGAM, supra note 4, at 361.
130 Family Law, arts. 830 and 839 do not take into account any future earnings of a spouse as
property in calculating marital property.
'3' Judgment of June 13, 1991, Seoul Gajong Bopwon [Family Court], 91 de 1220.
132 Id
133 Judgment of June 7, 1991, Seoul Gajong Bopwon [Family Court], 89 de 5838.
134 See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
135 Judgment of Jan. 10, 1992, Seoul Gajong Bopwon [Family Court], as reported in YONGAM,
supra note 4, at 347.
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as amounting to 30 percent, and ordered the husband to pay her 50 million
won (about $62,500).136 The wife ended up with $37,500, which amounts
to about 18 percent of the marital property of $208,000. Despite the court's
rhetoric of "equity" and "other circumstances," in the end all that the court
considered was the extent of the wife's contribution to marital property,
measured by the traditional yardstick that devalues women's worth.
A similar case, also hailed as an enlightened decision because the
court granted property to an adulterous wife, clarifies what is really meant
by "other circumstances" in the property division context. 137 The Supreme
Court held that the wife's entitlement should be lessened because she took
some of the family funds. 138 Notably, however, the court also pointed out
that her behavior-frequently leaving the home and behaving in an unchaste
manner-is an additional ground for reducing the award. 139
Although judges are not required to be sociologists or to work with
social science data, they must stay "in touch with the flow of events in the
world outside of the courts" 140 for equitable property division in a divorce
proceeding. One way to stay in touch with the realities of the women's
world is to listen to them. In an effort to persuade the legal system to more
properly value a woman's worth, various figures have been calculated for
judicial consideration. According to Korean Women Minwoohwe
["Democratic Friends' Association"], on the average, a Korean wife works
15.4 hours per day at home. 14 1 Calculated at the rate professionals would
charge, her work was deemed to be about 880,800 won per month (about
$1,100).142 The government figures are considerably lower, with an aver-
age of 7-hour work days for about $650 per month. 143 In the absence of
other fair measures, the court could base its decision somewhere between
the highest and lowest figures.
However, sole reliance on the reformation of individual judges is not
significantly different from the traditional faith in the magistrates as parents.
136 Id.
137 See supra note 121-124 and accompanying text.
138 Judgment of May II, 1993, Daebopwon [Supreme Court], 93 se 6.
139 Id.
140 RUBIN, supra note 14, at 184.
141 YONGAM, supra note 4, at 470.
142 Id See also Sang-suk Lee, supra note 83, at 149, for the type of "professional" help that would
be used for such calculation. For example, cleaning and dish washing would be done by a maid, children
would be taken care of by a nanny, management of the household and trips to the bank and government
bureaus for family business would be done by a butler.
143 YONGAM, supra note 4, at 470.
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Lucky litigants benefit from benevolent judges while others suffer arbitrary
and capricious decisions from less-enlightened judges. Women need
something that is more structurally sound and predictable than the
possibility that an individual judge has had a change of heart. A structural
change is possible only through legislative reform on the fundamental issue
of the Confucian male headship.
Until the legislature is able to overcome the powerful Confucian
lobby against the abolition of the male headship system, it could legislate
concrete protective measures in property division cases. For example,
where 50 percent of the common property would be inadequate to support a
non-wage-earning party after divorce, that party should be given more than
50 percent of the common property. Where the common property is so
meager that even a substantial portion would result in inequity, the party
with more career assets should be ordered to make support payments after
divorce. Even where the property is substantial, post-divorce payments may
be necessary in some cases for the parties to maintain the customary living
standards.144
Enforcement of post-divorce compensation may be a problem that
needs to be dealt with in concert with the legislative and executive branches
of the government. For example, changing a police force that tends to rein-
force conservative social values at the expense of the weaker party, usually
women, is not an easy task.145 However, if equality between men and
women is indeed a social goal, the judiciary, as well as the other branches of
power, should do nothing less.
C. Child Custody
The historic revision of Korean family law requires a couple to jointly
determine the question of child custody upon divorce. 146 Prior to the revi-
144 Sam-wha Kim, Jaesan Boonhal Chunggukwon [Right to Petition for Division of Property] 22,
in INKWONKWA JUNGEUI [HUMAN RIGHTS AND JUSTICE] (1991); Young-gap Kim, Jaesan Boonhal
Chunggukwon [Right to Petition for Division of Property] 28, in SABOPHANGJUNG [LEGAL
ADMINISTRATION] 1991(8); Me-young Cho, Jaesan Boonhal Chunggukwon [Right to Petition for Division
of Property] 82, in SABOPHANGJUNG [LEGAL ADMINISTRATION], 1990(8).
145 Wife beating is still considered a family matter and seldom merits police intervention. Sexual
harassment and rape cases have only recently begun to receive proper attention by the law enforcement and
courts. See Teresa Watanabe, South Korean Women Stride Toward Equality, L.A. Times, June 21, 1994, at
World Report 3; Wife Battering in S. Korea is Endemic, Says Poll, Apr. 3, 1994, Reuter Newswire-Far
East, available in WESTLAW, INT-NEWS Database.
146 Family Law, art. 837(1).
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sion, the father automatically claimed child custody, unless he waived this
right. 147 Moreover, even if the father waived his right to child custody, he
remained the sole parental authority ["chinkwon"].148 Thus, the mother was
compelled to defer to the remote father's decision on all matters regarding
the selection, registration, and transfer of the child's school; a child's
marriage before reaching the legal age for marriage; management and
disposal of the child's property; and any other matters related to the child's
education, health and welfare.
The new law empowers the court to resolve the issue in cases of
disagreement between the parties. 14 9 Judges are to consider the age of the
child or children, "the property status of the father and mother, and any
other circumstances thereof."150 As in the case of marital property division,
the law on child custody is sufficiently vague to allow for broad judicial
discretion.
In exercising their discretionary power under the new custody law,
judges continue to rely on their unexamined cultural assumptions at the
expense of the economically underprivileged women. In a traditionally
male-dominated society, where men control the economic means, reliance
on "property status" as a criterion tends to eliminate most mothers as
custodians.
For example, in a case decided in July 1994, the Seoul High Court
awarded custody to the father because of his superior property status.151
The court acknowledged that the husband's [unspecified] fault had com-
pelled the wife to leave the family. Yet it focused on the fact that the young
children (5 and 10 years old) had been living with the father while the wife
was away, and that the father had the superior economic means. 152 The
problematic reality is that because the woman had been a full-time mother
and wife until she was driven out, she was not in any position to assert
financial capacity to raise the children, or question the husband's fitness as
a parent. On the other hand, as an executive officer in an international
company, the father presented a strong case based on his property status.
147 Rosa Kim, supra note 3, at 5.
148 Family Law, art. 909, governing "Parental Authority" has been revised to give authority to both
parents.
149 Family Law, art. 837(2).
150 Id.
151 Judgments of Seoul Godeng Bopwon [High Court], 93 re 1022 and 1039, as reported in
Bopryul Shinmun [The Law Journal], July 7, 1994, at 13.
152 Id.
MAY 1995
PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL
A month earlier, the same court had awarded custody to a father, who
had been judicially determined to be the party responsible for the marital
breakup. Even though the court acknowledged the husband's known
practice of domestic violence, the court based its decision solely on the
husband's financial status.153
As shown in these cases, awarding child custody to the father because
of his superior economic means is a particularly egregious form of gender
bias based on circular reasoning: expecting mothers to stay home and then
taking away their children because of their weak economic base. The
Confucian tradition systematically suppresses meaningful job opportunities
for women outside the home. 154 Taking the children away from the mother
is a grave injustice for another deep-rooted reason. The patriarchal and
patrilineal society of Korea has compelled women to derive their identity
from the sons they bear to perpetuate the male ancestry.155 Given this-social
context, judges should interpret the laws that would allow women to live as
they choose without fear of drastically lessened living standards or loss of
children.
The "property status" test is inherently unfair. Until the law is
amended, the judiciary must use its discretionary power to level the playing
field. Judges must seriously reflect on the inseparable connection between
the award of child custody and marital property. An equitable share of the
marital property, including post-divorce child support payments when
necessary, should eliminate property status as a test of parental fitness.
Judges may then consider other tests, such as a history of parental violence
or the age of the child, in making decisions about child custody.
IV. CONCLUSION
Judges continue to rely on the Confucian social norms as an essential
basis for exercising their judicial discretion in family matters. Complete
eradication of judicial discretion is neither desirable nor possible.
Moreover, individual assumptions represent a personal and social dynamic,
153 Bopryul Shinmun [The Law Journal], June 13, 1994, at 5.
154 See supra note 127.
155 The law continues to sanction the automatic registration of children born of a marriage into the
father's family register. Hojokbob, see supra note 25. Pressure on a Korean woman to produce a son is so
strong that both men and women believe that an inability to bear a son is a ground for expelling wife from
home. Thus one woman with two daughters and no son lamented, "I could go to a fortune teller and be
told I have no children. Daughters don't count. Under Korean custom, my husband could drive me from
my home and deprive me of my status as a wife." Schoenberger, supra note 5, at 1.
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which is difficult to institutionalize or to regulate. However, judges should
consciously reflect on the woman litigant's struggles, particularly in a tradi-
tional society, and refrain, to the extent they are capable, from imposing
personal and social norms that perpetuate injustices to women not visited on
men.
Without judicial self-examination of taken-for-granted social
assumptions, broad judicial discretion can easily turn into a tool that
perpetuates discriminatory societal norms. This is not an accusation against
judges of bad faith assumptions based on simple misogyny or chauvinism.
Rather, this is an argument that cultural assumptions are not easily
questioned. Moreover, the status quo that maintains the asymmetrical rela-
tions of power between men and women is both more comfortable and less
threatening than a struggle for change.
A law that is remedial in nature requires special and sustained efforts
for enforcement. This requires an elevated sense of equity premised on the
principled application of judicial discretion. Judges need not decide in
favor of a woman. However, they must search for and attempt to eradicate
gender bias. In other words, they must pay special attention to a set of
interests and concerns that otherwise may be, and historically have been,
overlooked. 156
156. See Bartlett, supra note 18.
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